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Summary  findings
An assessment of the welfare gains from a targeted social  can be used as an instrumental variable for individual
program can be seriously biased unless it takes proper  participation.
account of the endogeneity of program participation.  The authors  use Bangladesh's Food for Education
Bias comes from two sources of placement  program to illustrate their approach. A single post-
endogeneity: the purposive targeting of the geographic  intervention  cross-sectional household survey was used
areas to receive the program, and the targeting of  to identify the impact of the program on school
individual recipients within selected areas.  attendance, using geographic placement at the village
Decentralization of program placement decisions is  level as an instrument for individual program placement.
common, because of the administrative cost of  To deal with bias from the endogeneity of village
centralized placement decisions and the fact that local  selection, the authors  used a detailed community survey
groups and governments are likely to be better informed  coordinated with the household survey to control for
about who most needs help. But full decentralization is  likely sources of heterogeneity in geographic influences
uncommon; the center typically retains control of broad  on school attendance, consistent with prior  information
geographic targeting.  on how the government targeted the program
Ravallion and Wodon  argue that partial  geographically.
decentralization of program placement decisions creates  They found that the programs had significant and
control and instrumental variables useful for identifying  sizable impacts on school attendance. At mean points,
program benefits.  the program's incentive increased attendance by 24
The central allocation to a local level of government is  percent of the maximum feasible days of schooling.
presumably based on observable indicators. The central  A regression estimator ignoring the purposive program
allocation will also influence the allocation to an  placement was found to result in a substantial
individual but is unlikely to determine outcomes at the  underestimation  of the program's impact. Indeed, the
individual level conditional on individual program  simplest possible control group method-assuming  that
participation.  So with suitable controls for the welfare-  nonparticipants  provide a valid counterfactual -
relevant geographic characteristics determining program  performed much better than a regression method treating
placement decisions, the center's allocation across areas  placement as exogenous.
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Walle.1.  Introduction
It is known that an assessment of the welfare gains from a targeted social program can be
seriously biased unless it takes proper account of the endogeneity of program participation.  Two
sources of bias can be identified. First there is placement endogeneity due to purposive targeting
of the geographic areas which are to receive the program. Secondly, there is placement
endogeneity due to targeting of the individual recipients within the selected areas.
This paper explores the scope for identifying the micro-level welfare impact of a social
program which relies in part on geographic decentralization for its placement. Decentralization is
often favored precisely because it can exploit specialized local knowledge for targeting -
knowledge that is not available to the center.  For example, local community groups might
prepare lists of beneficiaries based on their own perceptions of need.  Because this information is
unobserved by the center (which is arguably the main reason why decentralization was favored in
the first place) it is implausible that one could ever find suitable control variables to deal with
endogeneity of individual placement.  As is well recognized in the evaluation literature, 2 to deal
with this type of problem one needs an instrumental variable which determines program
placement at the individual level without also determining program outcomes conditional on
placement.  At first glance, one might well be skeptical of ever finding such a variable. The local
community group can be assumed to target the program according to a set of observed household
characteristics, every one of which would presumably also influence the household's behavior
and welfare, and thus should appear in a model for any likely outcome indicator.
2  See, for example,  Heckman  and Robb (1985)  and Mofitt  (1991).
2However, decentralization in this context often entails that the central government first
allocates across a lower level of government (defined geographically) and then governments at
that level allocate to a lower level and so on.  We call this "partial decentralization". A feature of
partial decentralization is geographic separability, whereby the allocation across individuals
within a given area is conditional on the allocation to that area, and is otherwise independent of
the attributes of other areas. Many targeted public programs have a placement structure of this
sort.  For example, school-based food distribution programs typically involve allocation
decisions first at the school or area level, and then among children within each school or area.
We argue that this common feature of decentralized programs helps the evaluation in two
ways: Firstly, the fact that the center retains control of the geographic placement suggests that
suitable control variables should be observable to deal with this source of endogeneity.  In World
Bank poverty projects, for example, considerable attention is typically given to geographic
placement on the basis of the geographic poverty profile. Then, in principle, one should be able
to find suitable control variables for geographic placement, and thus treat this aspect of the
problem as "selection on observables" (Bamow et al., 1980; Heckman and Robb, 1985). There
will no doubt be some omitted variables in any empirical model of geographic targeting, but with
information on the program and geographic data, this problem should be limited.
Secondly, partial decentralization can help by creating a valid instrumental variable for
individual program placement.  With geographically decentralized placement, and suitable
controls for household and geographic heterogeneity, we argue that program impacts at the
individual level can be estimated in a believable way while allowing for the endogeneity of both
geographic and individual placement.
3We apply the method to Bangladesh's Food for Education (FFE) program. The program
aims to keep the children of poor rural families in school. Participating households receive
monthly rations of food as long as they send their children to primary school regularly.
Targeting is done in two stages; first local areas are chosen by higher levels of government, and
then individual participants are selected by local community groups exploiting idiosyncratic
information.
The following section presents our model and estimation method. Section 3 applies the
method to Bangladesh's FFE program.  Section 4 concludes.
2.  Program Placement Model and Evaluation Method
A social program allocates IP, (for "individual placement") to the i'th individual. The
individual welfare outcome is Wi  which is assumed to depend linearly on IP, as well as vectors of
household characteristics X,, and geographic characteristics Z,. The regression model for the
welfare outcome is:
Wj = alP,  + PW  +  lq  Zi+  pi()
where Xand Z are assumed to be exogenous (orthogonal to Ri)  but IP is not.
Equation (1) is a reasonably standard formulation in the evaluation literature, though it
has limitations. Linearity in IP entails that the program has the same marginal impact for
everyone. One can readily relax this by allowing interaction effects with X and/or Z. However,
consistent estimation allowing for idiosyncratic impacts on outcomes at given X and Z is not
possible unless the idiosyncratic factors do not  influence program placement (Heckman, 1997).
4How is IP determined? We might imagine that the central government directly chooses
which individuals are allowed to participate. However, this is not a realistic model of public
decision making, since it assumes too much about the information available to the center. More
plausibly, the center leaves local governments or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in
each area to determine the allocation across individuals. This is administratively easier, and also
takes advantage of the fact that lower levels of government or local community organizations are
presumably better informed.
An implication of such decentralization of program placement is that the allocation to the
i'th household will depend on whether or not the program has been placed in its area of residence,
which we denote by the variable GP, (for "geographic placement").  The allocation will
presumably also depend on household characteristics, not all of which are observed. We write the
model determining individual placement as:
IPj-yGPj  + 7rX,  +  (2)
where v is an error term embodying the unobserved influences on IP. The endogeneity of
program placement at the household level means that the error term in equation (2) is correlated
with that in (1).  If the program is targeted to households with low (high) values of the outcome
indicator then there will be underestimation (overestimation) of the program's impact. To obtain
consistent estimates of program effects with a single cross-section survey we can, however, use
GP as an instrument for IP as long as GP is not itself correlated with p.. For this condition to
hold it is crucial that the vector Z contains all welfare-relevant variables used by the center in
deciding geographic placement.  If the omitted variables which determine the center's choice of
5target areas also alter outcomes at the household level then GP will no longer be a valid
instrument for IP.  Whether the assumption that Z contains all relevant control variables is
defensible in practice will depend on how much infomation the evaluator has on how the center
chooses program areas.
This approach does not require a baseline survey. For the class of partially decentralized
programs described above, consistent estimates of the welfare impacts are possible using a single
cross-section survey.  The cross-sectional data must, however, include both household
characteristics and relevant characteristics of the geographic area in which the household lives. It
is not uncommon for household socio-economic surveys to include surveys of the infrastructure
and services available in the area of residence for each sampled household.  In the application
which follows we have a community survey which includes a wide range of geographic variables
of likely relevance to the center's geographic placement decisions; in this case there is less
concern about omitted geographic variables than there would be without such data.
Notice that if one had not used geographic data on program placement as an instrument
for individual placement, then one could deal with any omitted geographic variables by including
a complete set of geographic dummy variables (or, equivalently, taking deviations from
geographic means). However, that option is precluded here, since the geographic dummy
variables will be collinear with GP.
So there is a sense in which dealing with one source of bias in the outcome equation,
namely placement endogeneity at the individual level, limits our ability to deal with another
source of bias, namely omitted geographic variables determining both outcomes and program
placement by geographic area.
6However, it can be argued that when the center is trying to assess the impact of a
decentralized program, the greater concern must be unobserved determinants of individual
placement by lower levels of government or NGOs.  The point of decentralization is to exploit
local information not available to the center.  By contrast, the center's geographic targeting of
program areas must presumably be based on variables which are observable to the center.
3.  Bangladesh's Food for Education Program
FFE was launched on a pilot basis in July 1993 and has grown since then into a major
national program.  Its objectives are to increase primary school attendances for poor children by
providing rations of rice or wheat to selected households as an incentive to parents. The total
budgetary cost from July 1993 to June 1997 was Tk 760 crores or $175 million (BIDS, 1997: 8).
The program's  share of the budget of the Primary and Mass Education Division increased from
I 1 percent in 1993-94 to 26 percent in 1995-96. In 1995-96, 2.2 million children, or about 13
percent of the total enrollment in mainstream schools-participated in the program.
The program has a hierarchical targeting structure. Bangladesh's administrative structure
consists of (in decreasing order by size) divisions, districts, thanas, and unions.  The program
covers all thanas, and one or more unions are picked in each thana. The program stipulates that
these should be economically backward unions, and unions with low schooling attainments.
Within the selected unions, FFE is granted to all primary schools.
Second, within the selected union, targeting is done at the household level.  Community
groups select beneficiaries and distribute the food. The program rules suggest of criteria for
targeting (landless households, female-headed households, and households whose parents work
7in low-income  professions). However,  there is clearly  a degree  of discretion  in individual
targeting.
If a household  is selected  to participate  in FFE, it is entitled  to 15 kg of wheat or rice per
month for one child going  to school,  or 30 kg if the household  has more than two children  and all
of them attend school  regularly.  To receive  their rations,  the enrolled  children  must attend at least
85 percent of the classes each month. By the third day of each month,  the headmaster  of the
school  establishes  the list of all students  from beneficiary  households  who  met the 85%
attendance  threshold  for the previous  month.  The total rations  needed are then estimated  and
submitted  to the thana executive  for approval.  The required  food is made available  by the thana
to the school  with an additional  allowance  to cover the costs of transport,  distribution,  and
handling. The distribution  is made each week.
Our data come from the 1995-96  nationally  representative  Household  Expenditure  Survey
(HES) of the Bangladesh  Bureau  of Statistics. The HES included  questions  on FFE participation
and also had a community  survey  done at the local level.
To compute  the attendance  rate, we took into account  the number  of school  days missed
by each student,  as well as the number  of days during  which  the school  was closed and he or she
could not attend. A child not enrolled  was given  a zero  attendance  rate (thereby,  we capture
enrollment  and attendance  with one measure). For those enrolled,  the attendance  rate was
calculated  as the ratio of the actual attendance  to maximum  feasible  attendance,  given that there
are 23  5 school  days per year in Bangladesh. 3 The outcome  variable W  in equation  (1) is the
3  The  HES  gives  for  each  child  the school  days  missed  and  the number  of days  that  the school
was  closed.  Actual  attendance  was  estimated  as 235  days  minus  school  days  missed  minus  school  days
8mean attendance rate for each household. The sample mean attendance rate was 62.5%.  For
households participating in the program (about one tenth of the sample), the attendance rate was
79.8%, versus 60.3% for non-participants.
The measure of household participation is the quantity of foodgrains received under the
program. The mean amount received by the participating households was 1  14 kg per year. The
community module provides independent information on whether the community also
participates in FFE.  Our measure of geographic placement (GP) takes the value one if the
community survey indicates that the community participates.
The regressors in the vector Xk  in equation (1) included household size variables, family
structure variables, the education levels of the father and the mother, 4 the level of land
ownership in the household, the age of the child and its square, the religion of the household, and
whether or not the household receives FFE.
The geographic variables comprise two sets. The first are those we identified as likely
explanatory variables in a model such as this, even if there was no concern about endogeneity of
geographic placement. These comprised distances to school, the type of school (governmental,
private, NGO), and a series of school quality variables reported in the community survey.  The
second set of geographic variables are controls to deal with endogenous geographic placement.
The indicators used for this purpose included land distribution, irrigation intensity, road quality,
electrification, distance and time to thana and district headquarters and to the capital (Dhaka),
closed,  while maximum  feasible attendance  was 235 minus school days closed.
4 The excluded  dummies  are illiterate  father and mother. In Table 1, class 1 to 5 represents  some
primary education,  class 5 primary education  completed,  class 6 to 9 some secondary  education,  and
higher level secondary  education  or above (e.g. professional  or university  degree)  completed.
9distance to various facilities (health care, Banks, government agencies), incidence of natural
disasters, attitudes to womens' employment, education and family planning, average schooling
levels of the head and spouse, majority religion of the village, and population size of the village.
These geographic variables were (jointly) good predictors of program placement. A
probit regression of whether the village had the program on a range of likely indicators of
"economic backwardness" from the community survey gave a pseudo-R 2 of 0.55 (Chi-square of
91.7 which is significant at the 0.5% level, with 166 observations).
4.  Results
We estimated the system made up of equations (1) and (2) by Three Stage Least Squares
(3SLS), and compared it to the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of equation (1).  Table 1
gives the OLS estimate of (1) and the 3SLS estimate of (1) and (2). We give two versions of the
OLS equation; the first excludes the control variables for endogeneity of geographic placement,
while the second does not.
The regression for the average attendance rate looks sensible on the whole. Larger
families, and with higher proportions of young children, tend to have a lower average attendance
rate, suggesting crowding out. Higher education levels of both the mother and father increase
school attendance rates of children. So does greater wealth, as measured by land ownership.
However, it is unclear why proximity to a boys' school raises participation, while being closer to
a girls' school has the opposite effect.
Turning to the FFE program, the participation by the community (the instrumental
variable needed for identification) is a highly significant determinant of individual participation.
10The estimated parameter for program participation (a) in the school attendance equation is
positive and significantly different from zero for both the OLS and 3SLS methods, the latter
allowing for endogeneity of placement at both community and household level. However, the
3SLS estimate of a is 66% higher than the OLS estimate without the geographic controls, and
49% higher than the estimate with those controls. Almost all of the difference between the 3SLS
estimate and the simple OLS estimate is due to allowing for endogeneity of placement at the
individual level.
The coefficient a directly gives the increase in the attendance rate attributed to an extra
100 kilos of foodgrain.  Controlling for other characteristics, 100 kilos of grain increases the
attendance rate by 0.21 when one uses the 3SLS estimate, versus 0.13 using the simple OLS
model (and 0.14 for the model with geographic controls). When compared to the counter-factual
of obtaining nothing from the program, receiving the average amount (114 kg of grain) raises the
attendance rate by 0.24, i.e. an extra 24% of the maximum feasible days of school attendance can
be attributed to the incentive provided by the program. 5
On a priori grounds, the OLS estimate seems implausibly low. The mean attendance rate
of program participants is 84% (very close to the stipulated attendance rate of 85%, though
clearly this is not policed rigorously). The mean for participants is 60%.  So our 3SLS estimate at
mean FFE allocation turns out to be the difference between these two means.  We would get the
same estimate of program impact if we simply made the naive assumption that non-participants
are a valid control group.  However, the OLS estimate at the mean implies an attendance rate of
S  The implications  of this finding  for an overall assessment  of the cost effectiveness  of the
program  are examined  in Wodon  (1998).
1170% for FFE participants, which is well above the mean for non-participants, implying perverse
targeting of the program to kids with above average attendance.
We cannot of course rule out the possibility of remaining bias in our estimate of program
impact, due to some omitted determinant of geographic placement correlated with individual
attendances. Adding our geographic controls did help reduce the obvious bias in our OLS
estimate. Possibly if we had longitudinal geographic data then we could reduce the OLS bias
further. But in our analysis the bulk of the work is being done by the treatment for endogeneity in
individual targeting. In the context of decentralized programs such as FFE in Bangladesh, this is
arguably the bigger problem.
5.  Conclusion
Decentralization of program placement decisions appears to be common, and
understandably so, given the potentially high administrative cost of centralized placement
decisions across all individuals, and the fact that local governments and community groups are
likely to be better informed about who is most in need of help from the program. However, full
decentralization appears to be uncommon; more typically, the center retains control of the broad
targeting across geographic areas.
We have argued that partial decentralization of program placement decisions creates
useful control and instrumental variables for identifying program benefits. The central allocation
to the relevant local level of government is assumed to be based on observable indicators. The
central allocation will also influence the allocation to an individual, yet is unlikely to be a
determinant of outcomes at the individual level conditional on individual program participation.
12So, with suitable controls for the welfare-relevant geographic characteristics determining the
center's program placement decisions, one can use the center's allocation across areas as an
instrumental variable for individual participation.
The level of aggregation is important to our approach. If one were to aggregate up to the
level of local government areas for assessing welfare gains when there is only one level of
government then one would lose identification.  In a federal system with multiple layers between
the center and the individual program participant one can still aggregate geographically as long
as there is one layer left for identification with sufficient variation in placement horizontally
across that level.  In the seemingly common case of having geographically-clustered household
level data - with the clusters mapping into local levels of government with decision-making
power over the allocation of a centrally instigated program - we are able to identify welfare
iirpacts  at the micro level.
For our method to work well with only cross-sectional data, it is important that the
researcher can find sufficient control variables for geographic heterogeneity. As is invariably the
case without longitudinal observations, latent effects due to omitted variables correlated with
program placement can bias the estimates. Of particular concern in this context is any omitted
geographic heterogeneity which jointly influences outcomes and the geographic placement of
programs, since this undermines our case for using area placement as an instrument for
individual placement. This underlines the importance of combining the household survey data
with a geographic data base. Many surveys are now doing this.  It also points to the importance
of assuring that the geographic data collected correspond closely to the data actually used by
central program administrators.
13We have used Bangladesh's Food for Education program to illustrate the approach. A
single post-intervention cross-sectional household survey was used to identify the impact of the
program on school attendances, using geographic placement at village level as an instrument for
individual program participation. To deal with bias due to endogeneity of village selection, we
used a very detailed community survey coordinated with the household survey to control for
likely sources heterogeneity in geographic influences on school attendance, consistent with prior
information on how the government targeted the program geographically.
We found significant and sizable impacts of the program on school attendance. At mean
points, the program's  incentive increased attendance by 24% of the maximum feasible days of
schooling.  A regression estimator ignoring the purposive program placement was found to result
in a substantial underestimation of the program's impact; indeed, the simplest possible control
group method - assuming that non-participants provide a valid counter-factual - performed much
better than a regression method treating placement as exogenous.
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15Table 1: School  atendance  and FFE program  participation,  Bangladesh  1995-96
School  attendance  Program
participation
OLS  without  geographic  OLS  with geographic  3SLS  3SLS
controls  controls
coef.  s.e.  coef.  s.e.  coef.  s.e.  coef.  s.e.
Constant  -0.681 *  0.102  -0.582  +  0.298  -0.600 *  0.293  0.045  0.309
Demographics
Log household  size  -0.084 *  0.021  -0.060 *  0.023  -0.060 *  0.023  0.011  0.024
Share  boys 5 to 9  -0.294 *  0.075  -0.247 *  0.083  -0.248 *  0.082  0.018  0.086
Share  girls  5 to 9  -0.279 *  0.077  -0.222 *  0.086  -0.236 *  0.085  0.186 *  0.089
Share  boys 10 to 16  -0.234 *  0.070  -0.178 *  0.078  -0.179 *  0.076  0.049  0.081
Share  girls 10to 16  -0.111  0.073  -0.088  0.080  -0.088  0.079  0.062  0.083
Share  adults  male 17to40  0.123  0.077  0.070  0.086  0.069  0.085  -0.022  0.090
Share  adults  female  17 to  40  -0.035  0.089  0.077  0.099  0.076  0.098  -0.034  0.103
Share  adults  male  above  40  -0.023  0.090  -0.030  0.100  -0.046  0.099  0.221 *  0.104
Share  adults  female  above  40  0.002  0.089  0.027  0.099  0.035  0.097  -0.079  0.102
Female  household  head  0.013  0.047  0.006  0.050  0.002  0.050  0.057  0.052
No spouse,  married  -0.011  0.043  -0.025  0.047  -0.019  0.046  -0.074  0.049
No spouse,  single  -0.013  0.039  0.007  0.043  0.006  0.042  0.031  0.044
No  spouse,  div./widowed  -0.092 *  0.046  -0.056  0.049  -0.053  0.048  -0.075  0.051
Education father
Below  class  5  0.090 *  0.019  0.080 *  0.022  0.078 *  0.022  0.027  0.023
Class  5  0.137 *  0.024  0.097 *  0.027  0.099 *  0.027  -0.045  0.028
Class  6 to 9  0.160 *  0.021  0.134 *  0.024  0.136 *  0.024  -0.006  0.025
Higher  level  0.173 *  0.031  0.163 *  0.035  0.166 *  0.035  -0.031  0.036
Education  mother
Below  class  5  0.092 *  0.022  0.088 *  0.024  0.084 *  0.024  0.046 +  0.025
Class  5  0.066 *  0.024  0.055 +  0.029  0.053 +  0.029  0.025  0.030
Class  6 to 9  0.072 *  0.030  0.059 +  0.034  0.059 +  0.034  -0.002  0.035
Higher  level  0.179 *  0.071  0.151 +  0.079  0.150 +  0.077  0.026  0.082Land ownership  r1
0.05  to 0.49  acres  0.050 *  0.018  0.030  0.021  0.031  0.020  -0.002  0.022
0.50 to 1.49 avres  0.107  *  0.020  0.096  *  0.023  0.098  *  0.023  -0.006  0.024
1.50 to 2.49 acres  0.096  *  0.025  0.098  *  0.028  0.104  *  0.028  -0.074  *  0.029
2.50 acres or more  0.071  *  0.023  0.079  *  0.028  0.084  *  0.027  -0.073  *  0.029
Other household  variables
Mean age of the kids  0.321  *  0.018  0.310  *  0.020  0.303  *  0.020  0.079  *  0.021
Mean  age of the kids squared  -0.018  *  0.001  -0.017  *  0.001  -0.017  *  0.001  -0.004  *  0.001
Non-Muslim  -0.059 *  0.020  -0.036  0.025  -0.036  0.025  -0.006  0.026
School  variables
Distance  to primary  school  for boys  -0.001  0.003  -0.107 *  0.024  -0.102 *  0.024  -0.064 *  0.025
Distance  to primary  school  for girls  0.001  0.003  0.103 *  0.024  0.098 *  0.024  0.065 *  0.025
Main  school  government  aided  0.007  0.016  -0.006  0.021  -0.006  0.021  0.039 +  0.022
Main  school  private  0.107 *  0.035  0.055  0.048  0.063  0.047  -0.122 *  0.049
Main  school  NGO  -0.067  0.075  0.014  0.083  0.023  0.082  -0.005  0.087
Complaints  on  government  schools
Not  enough  primary  institutions  -0.003  0.021  -0.012  0.030  -0.008  0.030  0.004  0.031
Not  enough  primary  institutions  for girls  -0.025  0.029  0.012  0.036  -0.007  0.036  0.273 *  0.037
Not  enough  secondary  institutions  0.015  0.024  -0.030  0.033  -0.039  0.032  0.082 *  0.034
Not  enough  secondary  institutions  for girls  -0.034  0.028  -0.078 +  0.040  -0.085 *  0.039  0.033  0.041
Insufficient  quality  of teaching  -0.059 *  0.026  -0.040  0.033  -0.048  0.033  0.109 *  0.034
Insufficient  number  of teachers  -0.064 *  0.026  -0.011  0.036  -0.019  0.035  0.103 *  0.037
Other  complaints  0.048 +  0.028  0.017  0.040  0.008  0.040  0.043  0.042
Program  variables
Quantity of grain received by household  0.127  *  0.015  0.142  *  0.018  0.211  *  0.039
Participation  of  village  0.506 *  0.021
Source:  Source:  Regressions  by  the authors  using  1995-96  HES. Sample  size:  3625  rural  households.  Adjusted  R2 of 0.28  for OLS  without  geographic
controls,  0.30  with geographic  controls,  0.32  for 3SLS  outcome  equation,  and 0.37  for 3SLS  participation  equation. Excluded  categories  for dummy
variables  are  male  household  head,  spouse  present,  illiterate  father,  illiterate  mother,  landless  household,  and Muslim  household.  See text for
the variables  used  as geographic  controls  (50 community  variables  not  shown  in the Table).  The  symbols  * and + denote  significance  at the 5 and 10 percent
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